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Abstract: This purpose of this study is to analyze relevant research on Afghan refugees’ health 
and education outcomes in rural versus urban areas in the country. Subsequently, I offer policy 
recommendations based on my observations to improve the status of each outcome for refugees.  
I. Introduction 
 
Politically charged philosophical debates concentrate more frequently than ever on the rights 
of displaced persons. They are "moving people" in both senses of that term: on the move or 
migrating as well as stirring various emotions in host countries. As political theorist Seyla 
Benhabib confirms, refugees are not just aliens but fellow humans worthy of respect. It is hard to 
disagree with her that "the status of alienage ought not to denude [any]one of fundamental rights 
(Benhabib 3). This study presents evidence about the reception of one group of moving people, 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Afghans have crossed the border into Pakistan in appreciable 
numbers since the late 1970s, followed by another influx in the early 2000s. Studies of this group 
have been somewhat limited, especially in observing the policy implications for health services 
and educational opportunities. What follows compares policies and implementations in rural 
regions—the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and FATA (Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas)—with urban locations in the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Islamabad. Each 
section offers several policy suggestions to improve refugees' access to healthcare and education. 
Pakistan is recognized as one of the top refugee-hosting countries in the world, both 
registered and unregistered. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) issues an 
annual State of Human Rights, which details many statistics on Afghan refugees' current status. 
The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) of Pakistan estimates that there are 
approximately 2.8 million registered Afghan nationals in Pakistan, with around 1.4 million 
having Proof of Registration (PoR) cards. The actual number of refugees is most likely much 
higher. In 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan had announced that he would grant citizenship to 
the nearly 1.5 million Afghans born in Pakistan; however, this policy never came to fruition and 
Khan dismissed it merely as a suggestion (HRCP 241). The HRCP has reported an underlying 
perception that Afghan refugees are involved in criminal and terrorist activities, leading to 
persistent harassment by police and local authorities. 
In recent years, societal tension between Pakistanis and Afghans in Pakistan has started to 
transform into political tension. In their paper on "Mapping the Structure of Well-Being and 
Social Networks of Refugees," a research group with the Urban Institute found that in recent 
years, the "feeling of belongingness to Pakistan among some refugees is fading as their relations 
with the Pakistani state and host communities deteriorates" (Malik et al. 18). While not true for 
every refugee, a common trend is that the longer they stay, the less societal goodwill they receive 
(Malik). Given the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, some Pakistani natives view 
Afghans as the enemy.  
There are various estimates of Afghan refugees' total population size in Pakistan, both 
registered and unregistered. As of March 18, 2020, the UNHCR places the number of registered 
refugees with PoR cards in Pakistan at 1.42 million. This is a rough estimate, and the number of 
unregistered refugees is unknown, however that total is likely closer to 8 million. It is up for 
debate whether some of these individuals would still be considered refugees, particularly those 
born in Pakistan and have never been to Afghanistan. An estimated 80% of registered refugees 
have been in the country for over two decades, some foreign and native-born (United States 
Congress 3). As in many other refugee-hosting nations, the identity of children of migrants who 
either came when they were very young or were born in exile remains an issue in political 
membership and status. Subsequently, many Afghans who have lived in Pakistan for much or all 
of their lives may not be entitled to all of the rights that a Pakistani native is, although they have 
no current relation to Afghanistan.   
This study will look at the differences between refugee outcomes for those living in rural 
versus urban areas. In terms of refugees' geographical placement, around 68% of the total 
registered Afghan refugees live in urban and rural areas of Pakistan, and 32% percent live in the 
country's refugee villages as of December 2018. According to the UNHCR, there are 54 known 
refugee villages across the country (HRCP 239). As of March 18, 2020, the number of refugees 









Azad Jammu & Kashmir 4,302 
Gilgit-Baltistan 5 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan share a border with Afghanistan, and they are 
generally the first places where refugees go when they seek asylum. Peshawar is also located in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is a major hub for Afghan refugees to enter. Not only does it share 
geographical proximity to Afghanistan, but a majority of the population shares a common 
Pashtun ancestry with the Afghans across the border. This shared ethnicity helps with social and 
kinship ties for refugees. Many refugees residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and FATA (a 
tribal area that recently merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) live in a rural setting. Conversely, 
many refugees living in Balochistan, Sindh, and Islamabad live in urban areas. Each 
demographic faces unique challenges and circumstances. 
Proof of Registration (PoR) cards are the Pakistani government-issued identification 
cards that provide temporary legal stay and freedom of movement within the country to 
registered Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. There are four main centers located in 
Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, and Rawalpindi, where refugees can register for and replace existing 
cards. At these centers, refugees can also register the birth of children under the age of 18 and 
receive official birth certificates (UNHCR [Refugees Registration Update] 1). According to the 
Foreigners Act, any Afghan refugee found without a PoR card or other valid visa documentation 
is considered an illegal immigrant (HRCP 240). When Proof of Registration cards were first 
extended to refugees by NADRA in 2006, they carried validity until December 2009. Now, the 
Pakistani government has been granting extensions every couple of years. A recent extension 
was made on June 27, 2019 by the Federal Cabinet. In their meeting they decided to extend the 
PoR card validity until June 2020 (UNHCR [Refugees Registration Update] 1). Just as in the 
population breakdown, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa hosts the largest number of PoR cardholders due to 
its proximity to Afghanistan and the central registration center in Peshawar. The smaller centers 
in Quetta, Rawalpindi, and Karachi are located in Balochistan, Punjab, and Sindh, respectively. 
While the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951 states that any person born in Pakistan shall 
be a citizen by birth, this has not been true for the children of Afghan refugees born in Pakistan. 
Although officially no changes were made to the Citizenship Act to account for Afghan refugees, 
the government uses discretionary policies to determine this population's citizenship rights. 
Given the Citizenship Act guidelines, all refugees born in Pakistan should be eligible to obtain 
citizenship, but they are "generally discouraged from doing so" (HRCP 241). Complicated 
political motivations exacerbate the condition of statelessness for Afghan refugees. Similar 
practices take place in Iran. In an interview with an Afghan refugee student who moved to the 
US, she explained the process of seeking refuge for her family. Although she was born in Iran, 
where her family initially took refuge, she did not receive paperwork such as an Irani birth 
certificate or citizenship papers (Confidential). The same is true in Pakistan, where children of 
refugees born in the country have no formal birth certificate or citizenship. 
Aside from the current policy regarding the extension of PoR cards, the Pakistani 
government's primary policy is refugees' repatriation to Afghanistan. This is an issue as there are 
many second and third generations of Afghan refugees born in Pakistan who have never been to 
Afghanistan. According to a 2007 United States congressional report, over 50% of the current 
refugees in Pakistan arrived in 1979 and 1980 alone, meaning that many of the children of this 
wave of refugees were born in Pakistan (United States Congress 4). Repatriating these groups 
will be difficult because they do not have any existing ties to Afghanistan and their entire 
livelihoods are based in Pakistan.   
Even if ties to Afghanistan were not an issue, there are still many uncertainties for 
refugees attempting to repatriate. Although their situation in Pakistan may not be ideal, 
Afghanistan's current state does not offer stable education, healthcare, and employment 
opportunities. Afghanistan is also still in the midst of terrorist attacks, human rights violations, 
and other hazardous conditions that would make repatriation dangerous for Afghan natives. 
According to the UNHCR, other "push" factors for Afghan refugees voluntarily repatriating in 
2018 included strict border entry requirements (42%), loss of livelihood (12%), denial of access 
to services (8%), and uncertainty related to the PoR cards extension (5%). The main pull factor, 
accounting for 80% of total voluntary repatriations, was reuniting with family in Afghanistan. 
Other pull factors included better employment opportunities, being free from persecution, and 
receiving UNHCR financial assistance. For most refugees, a mix of push and pull factors caused 
them to repatriate (HRCP 242). This decision has been widespread in the past 20 years, with 
nearly 4.2 million refugees returning to Afghanistan with UNHCR assistance and approximately 
1.11 million refugees doing so without UNHCR assistance since 2002 (United States Congress). 
There has been an unprecedented number of returns to Afghanistan in recent years, with over 
700,000 refugees returning to their home country in 2016 alone. These repatriates are most likely 
not doing so entirely voluntarily, with widespread calls for Afghans to return to Afghanistan, 
even on the government level (Duenwald and Talishli). Meanwhile, the conditions in 
Afghanistan have not improved enough to prompt this high rate of returnees. The country is still 
engulfed in conflict and security concerns, offers little socioeconomic opportunity, and many 
Afghans have not lived there for multiple generations. What would be more beneficial for 
refugees is reconstructing internal policies to expand political membership. As Benhabib defines 
political membership as "the inclusion of immigrants and newcomers into existing policies," this 
study will focus on how Afghan refugees' political status can be improved (Benhabib 1). 
 
II. The Rural-Urban Divide 
 
With rural and urban landscapes as diverse as those found in Pakistan, this study sets forth 
tailored policy to both settings' unique challenges. Keeping this concern in mind, policymakers 
in countries like the United Kingdom, South Africa, and New Zealand have successfully 
employed the principle of "rural proofing." Rural proofing, both a political commitment and 
process, requires policymakers to consider each issue with a rural lens to develop equitable 
policy for rural communities that face added obstacles to healthcare, education, and 
infrastructure (Schmitz and Johnsen 1). Refugee policy especially ought to pay special attention 
to rural concerns, for refugees tend to be acutely vulnerable to the limited resources and poverty 
issues in a rural setting. Likewise, this paper develops an "urban proofing" approach to address 
refugees' specific struggles in urban areas with issues such as overpopulation, unsound 
infrastructure, and unfair working conditions. Far from their area of origin, displaced people fare 
worse than the average urban poor and experience a larger poverty gap, lower literacy rates, 
higher unemployment, and poorer living conditions. Rural and urban proofing provide the 
framework for policy suggestions that follow in this study. 
The broad geographic areas in Pakistan are the northern mountains, western highlands, the 
eastern deserts, and the Indus plains. The northern mountains on the border of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan account for a large part of the latter’s agricultural production. Just south of the mountain 
region, the western highlands are sparsely populated with small communities of nomads who 
rely primarily on agricultural and pastoral activity. The eastern desert region did not have many 
significant settlements through the 1980s; however, scattered populations have settled 
throughout the region in recent years. The Indus plains encompass almost all of Pakistan's major 
cities and are therefore the largest and most densely populated area in the country. Over the past 
half-century, Pakistan's urban makeup has over doubled, significantly increasing the population 
density of the Indus plains (Hasan and Raza 8). Moving people often migrate to these densely 
populated spots, as evidenced by the large majority of refugees' movement to the plains. 
Throughout the country are 54 UNHCR recognized refugee villages—many migrants first 
pass through these centers; however, 70% of the refugee population end up settling in urban 
areas. These villages receive the lion's share of international humanitarian aid, allowing them to 
operate and provide essential services ranging from primary education, basic healthcare, water, 
and sanitation. Peshawar, a city within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province in the northern 
region of the country, has 43 out of the 54 refugee villages, primarily due to its proximity to the 
Afghanistan border. 42% of refugees in KP live in a refugee village, undoubtedly because of 
UNHCR's vast presence there. In Balochistan, Quetta is home to 10 UNHCR recognized villages 
(UNHCR [Where We Work]). Despite the proliferation of these villages, oftentimes livelihood is 
unsustainable at these camps. Generally positioned on the outskirts of semi-urban communities, 
accessibility to both rural and urban jobs is scarce. Many villages have even experienced 
discontinuing food assistance, resulting in movement out into urban settlements to find work 
(Khan 22). 
Rural to urban migration is common for Afghan refugees, whether they are internally 
displaced and migrate to Kabul or externally displaced and migrate to major cities in Pakistan or 
Iran. Surveys from the Human Settlements Programme have indicated that even refugees who 
initially come to Pakistan from rural areas and repatriate eventually return to an urban area of 
Afghanistan such as Kabul (Hasan and Raza 1). In my interview with the Afghan student, noted 
that rural areas are more likely to be controlled by the Taliban—contributing to the generational 
lack of education and focus on agricultural jobs and creating a need for refugees to emigrate 
(Confidential). When refugees arrive in the city, they are met not only with uncertainty about 
their status as residents and resources, but uncertainty with urban life and culture shock as well. 
Although a lesser number of refugees migrate to rural areas, it is not uncommon. Primarily 
motivated by ties to family members in Pakistan, some Afghan refugees stay close to the 
northern mountain region's border. In this regard, rural to rural migration may be an easier 
transition; however, it is an option available only to those who already have ties in Pakistan and 
has limited resources.    
Further segregating the rural-urban divide is the relationship of refugees to their host 
communities. The feeling of belonging—or conversely, of otherness, is deeply tied to the 
landscape refugees find themselves in. The migrant who travels just across the border to a 
locality in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa may move in with kin or friends of the same Pashtun ethnicity 
who welcome him and help find employment. Meanwhile, the migrant who travels to a bustling 
city center in Punjab with no social network might find the relationship less accommodating.    
Afghan refugees in urban centers add pressure to these areas' limited capacities and are often 
viewed as a strain on already insufficient infrastructure, including transportation, electricity 
generation, and water and sanitation. In these areas, government policy, rising bias against 
Afghans, and misinformation coalesce in opposition to refugees. The most comprehensive policy 
that has been pushed by the government to date is for repatriation, despite rarely being in the best 
interest of migrants. In recent years, repatriation efforts have been largely publicized, finding 
their way to mainstream opinion and manifesting in the day-to-day interactions between Afghans 
and Pakistanis. One clear example of aversion to Afghan refugees in urban areas is the frequent 
occurrence of wrongful profiling by police and local authorities (HRCP 237). A lack of 
institutional trust between refugees and the government has posed issues for migrants living in 
heavily populated areas.  
This phenomenon has political underpinnings dating back to the late 20th century. The 
streams of refugees in the 1980s and 1990s, as researcher Ammar Malik explains, were seen as 
kin in need, resulting in "widespread government and societal goodwill toward [them]...[they] 
were together with the Pakistanis in the struggle against the USSR and communism". The early 
2000s movement towards defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan shifted this societal goodwill to 
societal suspicion. As Pakistanis were killed by US forces attempting to bomb Taliban forces, 
Afghan refugees were frequently viewed as the enemy as well, furthering the identity of 
otherness upon them. Within the international human rights framework, Hannah Arendt has 
written on this notion of otherness and human beings' treatment as "superfluous." When millions 
of human beings are rendered stateless and denied the right to have rights, she argues, the loss of 
all rights follows (Benhabib 50). The same has been valid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This 
study invokes an appeal to the humanity in each refugee. Each new arrival should be able to 
participate as members of civil society when arriving in unfamiliar lands, from the rural northern 
mountains to the urban Indus plains.  
 
III. Access to Healthcare Services 
 
A) Introduction 
Health services and educational opportunities are closely correlated. Greater access to 
education yields better health outcomes, and the impact of improved community health can 
create opportunities for those who may not typically attend or teach in schools. More so than the 
general population, people leaving areas of conflict are dealing with both short- and long-term 
health consequences when they seek refuge—access to healthcare services is vital for survival. 
Notably, without a clear path to citizenship, refugees are often left out of national health 
programs, leading them to either not seek health services at all or with much difficulty. This 
study maps two pressing concerns in the realm of refugee health care: refugee women's health 
and mental health services. Furthermore, this discussion of health reviews the effects of the 
recent coronavirus pandemic on policies and practices related to refugees.  
Predictably, the difficulty for rural regions is in collecting healthcare data, and the 
availability and quality of health services and hospitals. The consequences of such a dearth of 
healthcare can be fatal. On the other end, refugees entering urban areas are at risk as well. Many 
migrants exit their rural homes in Afghanistan to urban cities in Pakistan, often immigrating 
from a non-endemic to an endemic region. In these regions, they do not possess immunity to 
many illnesses that the local community might be immune to already (Suleman Malik et al.). 
Furthermore, the location of refugee villages created by UNHCR and other international 
organizations—situated on the outskirts of urban areas—exposes migrants to vulnerabilities. Not 
only are these villages not located near established hospitals, but they also pose a threat of 
spreading illnesses to the rural populations nearby. Each setting brings different challenges, 
heightened in the context of women's healthcare, mental health, and public health crises.  
 
B) Women’s Health 
Female refugees are the crux and heart of their communities. Their health, particularly their 
reproductive health, determines their children's health and outcomes and the next generation of 
Afghan migrants. Moreover, while adverse health outcomes are present for all refugees, female 
refugees are susceptible to inequalities in care that their male counterparts are not. Many refugee 
village health services only focus on maternal and child health services, leaving unmarried young 
girls and boys without education on sexual and reproductive health. Furthermore, socio-cultural 
norms stigmatize many aspects of women's reproductive health, and therefore male involvement 
in family planning is minimal. Many refugee villages do not even have reproductive health 
specialists at all. Of the eighteen implementing partner services in Balochistan, only six have a 
reproductive health coordinator (Afzal and Krause 6). Women's health impacts entire 
communities' success, and when Afghan women lack education and services for their health, it 
negatively impacts everyone.  
Sexually transmitted diseases are highly stigmatized due to the traditional values in both 
Afghan and Pakistani cultures. In the refugee villages, many staff members do not have proper 
training or equipment to prevent infections, including HIV and AIDs through bodily fluids. Basic 
hygienic practices such as handwashing between patients were not always practiced, risking 
contamination and spreading infection. Although prophylactics are available at many village and 
urban clinics for refugees, they are not always free, and women rarely receive information on 
safe sexual practices. Especially in Pakistan's most rural corners, families are uninformed on best 
practices to maintain sexual health. The patriarchal structure of Pakistani society also dictates the 
care and conversation surrounding sexually transmitted diseases. Such diseases are considered 
taboo in Afghan and Pakistani culture, and women are often subject to their husbands' decisions 
regarding birth control and sexual protection. The Women's Refugee Commission found that 
women frequently refused to take condoms home as they would not be able to convince their 
partner of condom use (Afzal and Krause 7). Especially given the young age that many Afghan 
girls get married to reduce their family's financial strain, education on sexually transmitted 
diseases is sparse.  
Afghan refugees come from a country with some of the lowest reproductive health conditions 
globally, especially in rural areas previously Taliban-controlled. Family planning services are not 
widely used in rural areas of Pakistan and are particularly inaccessible to Afghan refugees. Even 
in urban areas, Afghan women are less likely to receive family planning and reproductive 
healthcare than their Pakistani native counterparts. In Pakistan, the two most widely known 
contraception methods are oral pills and injectable contraception; however, oral pills do not 
typically have successful continued use by Afghan women.  Intrauterine devices (IUDs) are 
rarely available at refugee village health units. Contraception is also generally perceived to be on 
the onus of the woman, and therefore males do not take an active role in family planning. 
Further, emergency contraception is more difficult for Afghan refugee women to obtain. 
Emergency contraception includes oral pills that can be taken up to 72 hours after unprotected 
sexual intercourse and abortion inducing pills. Afghan women have a more challenging time 
obtaining these services at refugee village health units owing to the lack of information and 
proximity to hospitals. In terms of seeking an abortion procedure, they will most likely not 
receive post-abortion counseling (Afzal and Krause 7). The lack of post-abortion care further 
discourages women from seeking these procedures, a disservice to Afghan women across the 
country. The inability to determine when and if one will become pregnant compounds the 
powerlessness in taking control of one's health outcomes.   
The safety of Afghan mothers throughout pregnancy and labor is in dire condition. In 2015, 
the United States CIA reported the maternal mortality ratio (number of female deaths related to 
pregnancy) in Afghanistan to be 396 deaths per 100,000 live births, putting it at #28 worst 
globally (CIA). In rural areas of Afghanistan, this is thought to be a much higher ratio. Many of 
these maternal deaths were deemed preventable due to a lack of health services (Afzal and 
Krause 6). Pakistan's maternal mortality ratio is at #53, with 173 deaths per 100,000 live births; 
however, Afghan mothers face higher mortality rates than their Pakistani counterparts. In refugee 
villages and rural areas, most women are likely to deliver in the home. If they are in a refugee 
village, the World Health Organization sends "Lady Health Visitors" for three to four prenatal 
visits, and many women give birth with the help of a midwife. During prenatal visits, pregnant 
women may receive blood grouping and hemoglobin testing; however, these are not always 
readily available.  Clean delivery kits for pregnant women have typically been distributed by 
refugee organizations such as UNHCR, International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children 
(Afzal and Krause 6). 
It is astoundingly evident that ethnicity is a determinant for maternal and newborn risk. In a 
country that already suffers from increased maternal risk like Pakistan, this factor has even more 
critical consequences for Afghan women. A study in the Journal of Pakistan Medical Association 
(JPMA) found that ethnic differences impacted neonatal health, maternal weight, height, and 
parity. One of the primary findings of this study showed that Afghan mothers' limited mobility 
was the main reason for preventable maternal deaths. Moreover, this study found that the risk 
factors associated with prenatal status may be more indicative of mother and newborn mortality 
than the actual delivery conditions. The charts below show the difference in prenatal risk factors 







































































(Data: Badshah et al.) 
When displayed proportionally against Afghan refugee and Pakistani mothers, the survey 
results reveal that Afghan mothers tend to have more significant risks before the delivery that 
impact maternal and newborn health. Afghan refugee women were more likely to report that they 
reside in tribal areas, which generally have less access to prenatal care services than settled areas. 
Afghan women were only slightly more likely to report that they were from a low-income 
household. The survey setting—a public hospital in Peshawar—most likely contributes to this 
response, and at-home deliveries would perhaps yield different results.  Maternal illiteracy was 
nearly even between Afghan and Pakistani women (with most of both populations being 
illiterate). Paternal illiteracy, on the other hand, was more common with Afghan refugees. 
Suppose both the mother and father are illiterate. In that case, they are less likely to access 
educational materials about prenatal care and avoid risk factors for pregnancy, significantly 
impacting the woman and child's overall health during pregnancy. Pregnancy loss, whether 
through induced abortion or miscarriage, was also more common for Afghan refugee women. 
Observing the pregnancy registration rate is also significant as a woman is more likely to access 
professional prenatal care if she registers her pregnancy and is more likely to register the birth—
positively impacting the child's health maintenance. 
Two more factors this study considered were the mental health and age of mothers 
observed. Given the stressors of forced migration and assimilating to an entirely new 
environment, Afghan refugees are especially susceptible to aggravated mental health conditions, 
impacting pregnancy. In addition, the trend of surveyed mothers showed that Afghan refugee 
mothers were older than Pakistani mothers, introducing a new host of complications (Badshah et 
al. 164). The exact reason for this trend is unknown; however, the presence of conflict in young 
women's lives may prevent them from becoming pregnant until later on in life, or perhaps a lack 
of contraception usage among older Afghan women in Pakistan contributes to the older average 
age of pregnancy.   
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan struggle with gender-based violence, resulting in Afghan 
refugee women experiencing this tragedy both pre- and post-migration. However, in the latter, 
refugee women may not have access to the same kinship and social networks they may have had 
in their home country. There is little information on gender-based violence in Pakistan and even 
more limited information in Afghanistan; however, human rights groups have reported sexual 
violence, sex trafficking, abduction, forced early marriage, and domestic violence. In particularly 
conservative areas, many gender-based violence victims are wrongfully accused of adultery and 
forced to marry their attackers (Afzal and Krause 6). The silence surrounding gender-based 
violence is perhaps the most dangerous threat to women's health. This invisibility of Afghan 
women refugees further exacerbates their vulnerability to sexual and domestic violence.  
 
C) Mental Health 
Mental health is not a widely discussed subject in communities globally, and Pakistan is 
no exception. Traumatic life events, such as intense conflict early in life, separation from family 
members, and the impact of war on the personal life make refugees of any ethnicity extremely 
vulnerable to mental health complications. Post-traumatic stress syndrome is widespread in 
people who have experienced such painful conflict in their lives. Many of the aspects presented 
in this paper—poor health, limited access to educational services, extreme poverty, and the 
feeling of statelessness all contribute to deleterious mental health consequences for Afghan 
refugees. Psychological concerns impact refugees in both rural and urban areas. Nevertheless, it 
may be much harder for individuals in rural communities to seek professional help, and in most 
cases, they never will.   
Like much health data, information on refugees' mental health status is limited; however, 
one study in the Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health in 2005 reports on children's mental health 
status in refugee camps. Although 15 years old, this data is pivotal in understanding the 
background of the current generation of adult Afghan refugees' mental health from when they 
experienced trauma in their childhood. This study surveyed boys from four refugee schools and 
girls from two refugee schools in Peshawar around the ages of 7-12. Through aggregating the 









































(Data: Izutsu et al. 95) 
The results of this study are disheartening. Conducted in 2005, many of the children 
surveyed most likely experienced the conflict involving the Taliban and US invasion in the early 
2000s. The living environment survey reported that nearly 36% had a family member killed in 
the war, a devastatingly traumatic event. Most children in the camp reported having enough to 
eat; however, it was almost evenly split if the child felt happy in the camp or not.  
Overwhelmingly, the children in the study reported wanting to return home to 
Afghanistan. For these children, being ripped away from their way of living and placed in an 
unstable and new environment was pernicious to their early childhood adjustment. Conflict to 
this extreme also likely causes lasting mental health implications. The majority of children 
reported chronic nightmares, crying easily, and blaming themselves for the current situation. 
Nearly 50% of respondents reported feeling no future and experiencing suicidal thoughts (Izutsu 
et al. 96). This study reveals tragic and significant information on the state of these young 
children, who are most likely reaching their late twenties and thirties now. Significant childhood 
trauma impacts the lives and decisions individuals have as adults. Even the subjects of this study, 
who have now been in Pakistan for over fifteen years, could still be impacted by their childhood 
mental health's lasting effects.   
 
D) COVID-19 
Most recently, the spread of the novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has posed a 
threat to refugee communities across the world. COVID-19 is a respiratory illness spread person 
to person mainly through droplets produced by an infected person's cough or sneeze. This virus's 
novelty makes it difficult to understand how easily it can spread and may be asymptomatic for 
some infected people. The elderly and immunocompromised individuals are at greater risk of 
fatality by this illness. 
The fragility of refugee healthcare services in Pakistan are especially vulnerable to the 
threat of COVID-19. These health units lack access to tests and recovery resources for the 
infected. Additionally, refugees in rural and urban areas are likely to live close to others, making 
"social distancing" practices much harder to follow. Refugees are also more likely to be unskilled 
laborers, and therefore may still be reporting for work and increasing their exposure to the virus. 
Across the world, low-income individuals are being hit hardest by this virus, and resource-
lacking refugees may be hit hardest of all. While there is limited data on the actual impact of this 
ever-growing situation, it is clear that Pakistan's government must monitor refugee villages' 
situations to ensure that they have proper support.  
 
Policy Recommendations: Healthcare Services 
I. Recognition in national healthcare programs 
a. Allow refugees to use Proof of Registration (PoR) cards as a valid form of 
identification for use in hospitals. 
b. In refugee villages, create a streamlined program to have Afghan women register 
their pregnancies and register their children with NADRA upon birth. 
II. Accessibility for rural refugees 
a. Adopt a mobile-hospital system for use in rural areas and refugee villages. These 
mobile hospitals can travel within a wide radius of rural villages. 
i. Services may include immunizations, screenings, oral health services, 
laboratory services, or counseling for chronic disease management. 
ii. Implement proper hygiene practices in these mobile clinics and other 
refugee clinics. Additionally, create a system of accountability to lower cases 
of HIV/AIDs due to poor cleanliness. 
iii. For domestic violence prevention, mandate healthcare professionals 
operating clinics to ask women in privacy about domestic and gender-
based violence and equip her with resources to help. 
b. Create a bus/van system from rural areas to local hospitals to ensure access to 
quality care. Some Afghan workers already have driving skills, so this can offer 
new job opportunities. 
c. Place reproductive health specialists in every refugee village. 
d. Provide post-abortion counseling in every abortion clinic for refugees. 
e. Mandate that every new arrival, particularly children, see a psychologist at the 
refugee village they enter to inspect trauma-related mental illness.  
III. Community building 
a. Partner with UNHCR and other refugee organizations to provide midwife training 
for Afghan women, which many Afghan women already do informally. This could 
be a source of livelihood for women and provide maternal care to rural women who 
are unable to travel to a hospital. 
b. Build women's community centers in semi-rural areas equipped with broadband 
internet access to empower women to seek out information regarding their health. 
IV. Changes in Pakistani national policy 
a. Urban areas are subject to intense smog, contributing to the incidence of 
respiratory illness amongst Afghan refugees. Refugees should have access to free 
face coverings. 
i. Urban governments must pressure Pakistan's national government to sign 
onto more international environment treaties. 
b. Increase criminal punishment for domestic violence, sexual assault, and rape. 
c. COVID-19: International refugee organizations and the Pakistan national 
government must work in concert to fully fund vaccinations in refugee villages. 
 
V. Educational Opportunities 
A) Introduction 
Central to the situation of refugee education is a broader context of the flawed education 
system in Pakistan. Adult literacy in Pakistan, only 57% of the adult population, leaves many 
without elementary reading and writing skills. Gendered expectations, quality of instruction, 
proximity to school, and lack of government expenditures on education all contribute to the dire 
state of Pakistan's education sector (Mujahid-Mukhtar 4). On the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI), Pakistan ranks 128 out of 138 countries in health and primary education, with 22.6 
million out-of-school children, the world's second-highest number. The percentage of out-of-
school children varies significantly by province, suggesting that geographical location and the 




Balochistan, a largely urban landscape, has the highest rate of out-of-school children—
70% of school-aged children do not receive a formal education. Many children face economic 
obstacles to education, whether they must contribute to household income or cannot afford 
private school tuition costs. The second-highest rate of out-of-school children is in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), situated in a solely rural landscape. Children in rural 
locations face more issues relating to accessibility and traditional cultural norms surrounding 
education, particularly for female children. Unsurprisingly, the lowest rate is in the capitol 
province of Islamabad, with only 12% of children out of school.  
In 2018-2019, only 2.4% of Pakistan's public GDP expenditures went towards education 
(Amin). Public education funds, already scarce, exceedingly go to the school head's salary, 
meaning that little goes to training teachers and developing quality curriculum (Mujahid-
Mukhtar 4). In particular, the government budget allotted to refugee education is protracted from 
emergency funds, even for refugees who have been in the country for years, perhaps even 
decades. This grants the government a short-term solution without creating a long-term action 
plan to address the poor education of Afghan refugees. Although much of the responsibility falls 
on the Pakistani government, it is also important to note that many of the top refugee-hosting 
countries are still focusing on their internal development. It is a global responsibility to ensure 
that the rights of moving people do not remain invisible.   
Aside from formal schooling, many families opt to send their children to madrasas—
centers for religious education in Islamic studies. Madrasas may serve as the primary instruction 
or can also supplement the formal education. Many Afghan refugees favor this form of 
education, and it provides necessary literacy skills, food, and shelter (Jenner 9). Although it is 
beneficial for many students who would otherwise be receiving no education, this form of 
education comes with drawbacks. On a panel led by the National Commission for Justice and 
Peace and National Commission for Human Rights, leaders from civil society organizations 
came together to discuss their concerns for an educational curriculum focused solely on religion. 
Current curriculum and textbooks are exclusionary to non-Muslim beliefs and even Muslim 
beliefs that are not a mainstream ideology for Pakistani society. Many Afghan refugees are from 
the Hazara community, an ethnic group that follows the Shia sect of Islam. Minority children 
may feel as though they need to hide their identity in school, which can lead to hate crimes or 
habits of physical violence on either end, especially when coupled with their ethnic and religious 
background. Even for Afghan refugee students who share the same mainstream religion as 
Pakistani natives, there is still a concern that some forms of informal religious instruction may 
lead to intolerance and extremism, creating a pathological habit and a culture of hate crimes.  
Conflict is one of the world's most formidable obstacles for a child's struggle to obtain an 
education. The UNHCR has reported that half of the world's out-of-school children are located in 
conflict zones. Perhaps one of the most disheartening realizations of this statistic is that refugee 
children are a population that could benefit their communities and home countries the most from 
a proper education. In the interview with the Afghan refugee student, she remarked how much 
she wished to return to her home country to help educate the population and improve the 
situation. Regardless of her education and background, she realized the situation in Afghanistan 
is not one that only a handful of Afghans can help fix (Confidential). It will require a large 
population of educated repatriates and worldwide cooperation.  
 
B) Current Policy 
In 2010, the Pakistani government amended section IX of the Constitution Act with 
article 25A, which states: "Right to education—the State shall provide free and compulsory 
education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined 
by law." Later, the government issued Act XXIV of 2012 to elaborate on the earlier act 
providing for free and compulsory education to all children. The first step in ensuring that more 
children have the quality education they deserve is government action and policy, so this act was 
an important measure for the Pakistani government. In many places throughout the act, some 
stipulations even reiterate that this education declaration includes all children, including those of 
migrant families.   
In Act XXIV Article 2d, the government defines education as extended to the 
"disadvantaged child, " meaning any child who belongs to a socially or economically 
disadvantaged class. Furthermore, Article 3 specifies that this right to education is a fundamental 
right, regardless of sex, nationality, or race. Article 3b states that the Act should "ensure 
admission of children of migrant families," and Article 3f states that it should "ensure that the 
disadvantaged child is not discriminated against and prevented from, on any grounds whatsoever, 
pursuing and completing education." 
Legally, every Afghan child should receive an education. Although many provisions 
obligate local governments to build schools where there are none and make education 
compulsory, there is a lack of accountability for government leaders to follow through on these 
guidelines. The same act that grants all of these provisions also creates restrictions: Article 12 of 
the Act on "Proof of age for admission" states that "For the purposes of admission to a school, 
the age of a child shall be determined on the basis of the Form-B of NADRA and birth certificate 
issued as prescribed." For Afghan refugees who never registered with the Pakistani state and do 
not hold birth certificates, these restrictions disqualify them from school admission. Refugees do 
not always have the resources to obtain a birth certificate or are otherwise discouraged from 
doing so. Therefore, the uncertainty surrounding their membership status contributes not only to 
the overarching feeling of statelessness but also to the limited access to educational services for 
refugees. 
Year after year, the government of Pakistan renews its commitments to education policy 
goals and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set forth by the United Nations. These 
goals include specifying the commitment to Afghan children. At the Leaders' Summit on 
Refugees held in 2016, Pakistan stated its commitment to ensuring "unhindered access of Afghan 
children to Pakistani schools" (Hasan et al. 8). Currently, the framework that the Pakistani 
government uses to create a policy for Afghan refugee education is within the regional Solutions 
Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), joint documents with UNHCR, and the Federal Cabinet's 
Comprehensive Policy for Voluntary Repatriation and Management of Afghan Refugees in 2017 
(Hasan et al. 8). Of course, setting goals is the first step necessary to improve conditions for 
Afghan refugee children and their families. However, there needs to be more tangible action, 
especially if the statistics on Afghan literacy show that the current policy does not do an 
adequate job with refugee education.   
 
C) Current State of Education for Afghan Refugees 
It is hard to say for certain how many Afghan refugees are receiving education services. 
Different agencies report different statistics on Afghan refugee education based on estimated and 
surveyed populations of registered and unregistered populations; however, many refugees are 
young and born in second or third-generation families of refugees. As of 2017, the UNHCR 
reported that 39% of registered refugees are school-aged children; however, this number is most 
likely much higher given that many refugees, even in second and third generations, do not have 
birth certificates (Hasan et al. 14). Of this population of registered school-aged Afghan children, 
a staggering 80% is currently out of school. The Afghan refugee population's total literacy is 
estimated at 33%, and this number lowers to 7.6% for women and girls (Jenner 4). Refugees first 
arriving in Pakistan through UNHCR or NGO-sponsored villages typically receive a basic 
education from makeshift institutions; however, these services are limited and not always 
utilized. Across all provinces, there are marked differences between male and female education, 
rural and urban education, and Afghan and Pakistani native access to education.   
 
Students currently enrolled by level of education (UNHCR [Population Profiling] 44) 
The chart above shows the distribution of enrolled Afghan students by level of education. 
The vast proportion of enrolled students are at the primary level at 57.7%. Many factors may 
contribute to this result: 1) The growing younger population of Afghan refugees, 2) More 
Afghan children are registering for birth certificates and are therefore allowed to enroll in 
primary school, or 3) The most plausible factor, that primary school enrollment is still relatively 
low, but the middle school and secondary school dropout rates are very high. The chart above 
clearly shows this third explanation, with the rate of enrollment for middle level and higher 
education dropping off by five times. While it is positive that the population's youngest are 
getting enrolled in primary school and receiving an educational foundation and basic literacy, it 
raises concerns on retention. The reasons that students drop out or never attend at all vary 
widely, particularly given socioeconomic status, gender, and geographical location. This chart 
also shows that after primary school, the next highest enrollment rate is in informal religious 
schooling at 18.2%. As mentioned earlier, religious schooling such as those offered in madrasas 
can be beneficial. They can provide housing and basic literacy skills; however, they do not give 
many opportunities to advance to higher education.   
High rates of dropouts in the Afghan student population also explain why the adult 
literacy rates remain low. Approximate adult literacy figures show that only 32.88% of Afghans 
can read and write, and for females, this lowers to 7.59%. Out of female refugees over the age of 
12, 41.73% do not have basic literacy skills (UNHCR [Population Profiling] 42). Lower adult 
literacy perpetuates path dependency in the Afghan community. If parents have no education, it 
almost ensures less access to social mobility and their children's opportunities to achieve literacy. 
Especially for females, greater literacy equates to more healthcare knowledge that can determine 
the maternal care they can access and the chance to educate their female children. Cyclical 
poverty and lack of education stand in the way of a future generation of Afghan refugees' 
contribution to the host community and involvement with Afghanistan's development. Adult 
literacy is also more challenging to improve. Most laws regarding education deal primarily with 
children—as aforementioned, the act passed in 2012 only provides for free and compulsory 
education for ages 5-16. A holistic reform for education must also include the adult population.  
 
D) Quality of Instruction 
After getting Afghan refugee children in school, quality of instruction is decisive on 
educational outcomes. Common issues with Pakistani schooling include absent teachers, poorly 
maintained infrastructure, and an ill-constructed curriculum (ICG 3). Particularly with 
infrastructural improvements, it is difficult for students to focus on studies when basic structures 
such as desk and furniture availability and toilet quality are lacking. If the first step is improving 
infrastructure, the second is rewriting and improving the curriculum. Different schools face 
different issues regarding accessibility to school and investment in education in the provincial 
governments.   
Afghan refugees living in the UNHCR refugee villages have access to the basic 
educational services they provide in the camps. In 2018, UNHCR was providing primary and 
secondary education to approximately 57,000 refugee children. Other international organizations 
and NGOs often pair up with UNHCR to help finance these refugee village schools. On paper, 
this seems like an excellent resource for refugee child education. However, the village schools' 
dropout rate is even higher than at urban and rural government schools—70%, making long-term 
instruction at these schools unsustainable. Generally, Afghan private schools are the best chance 
for Afghan refugee children to receive quality instruction; however, these schools range in price 
and can be very expensive. The Afghan consulates and embassy in Islamabad are currently 
working with the Afghan Ministry of Education to create cheaper private schools. If none of 
these options are accessible, generally public schools, informal schooling, and madrasas are the 
remaining choices (Nicolle 15).   
 
E) Rural-Urban Divide in Education 
Geographical location is a significant determinant in access to quality instruction. Rural 
areas are hit hardest by inaccessibility to school, especially for Afghan refugees who already face 
obstacles in obtaining educational services. Literacy rates for Afghan refugees in urban locales 
are almost double those in rural areas. Although the most considerable rate of out-of-school 
students in Pakistan is in the Balochistan province, the highest number of public schools 
accessed by Afghan children are located there. This may be because in Quetta's urban area, there 
are a limited number of Afghan private schools (Hasan et al. 14). The presence of rural and 
urban differences also further exacerbates gendered norms for Afghan girls. Particularly in more 
traditional, rural settings, girls are even more discouraged from seeking an education. If 
resources for education are already scarce in a rural area, boys will be the first to access those 




(UNHCR [Population Profiling] 48) 
The data above was taken from a survey of Afghans in Pakistan in 2011, detailing why 
out-of-school children were not attending school. The data was collected by district, and these 
charts separate the data into rural and urban districts. Rural districts included Pishin, Charsadda, 
Haripur, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Mansehra, Mardan, Nowshera, Dera Ismail Khan, Swabi, Attock, 
Chakwal, Kasur, and Mianwali. Urban districts included Quetta, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Karachi 
East, Malir, and Islamabad. The top three reasons for not attending school were the same for 
rural and urban districts: the family did not allow it, the child needed to work to support the 
family, and schooling was too expensive.   
The distribution, however, varied between rural and urban areas. In rural areas, the family 
not allowing the child to go to school was higher, at 37.2% compared to 26.1% in urban areas. 
This could potentially be due to a more conservative mindset in rural areas, particularly for 
female children. Both the child needing to work and schooling being too expensive were higher 
in urban areas, perhaps because of the urban poverty present in Pakistani cities and more 
opportunities for child labor. No school in the area and not liking school were both higher with 
refugees in rural areas, given the problems rural communities face in creating accessible 
schooling. These results indicate many unique challenges both rural and urban refugees face in 
accessing educational services. 
Rural and urban schools also have different needs when it comes to the classroom. In 
public and private schools in urban and peri-urban settings that Afghan children attend, the most 
significant concerns were a need for computers (42% of respondents), additional classrooms 
(37%), sports equipment (31%), toilets for children (29%), and science laboratory equipment 
(27%). In rural areas and refugee villages, the most profound concern was primary school 
furniture (95% of respondents), followed by the need for additional classrooms (49%) and 
additional toilets (28%). While there is variation between rural and urban areas' needs, the 
bottom line is both demographics lack access to necessities such as classrooms, furniture, and 
toilets. The quality of the is a large factor in whether families will enroll their child (Hasan et al. 
14).  
Another consideration is which geographic area refugees are coming from in 
Afghanistan. According to the Afghan student I interviewed, many refugees from rural areas in 
Afghanistan come from areas controlled by the Taliban, where there is a lack of school and 
education. In these rural areas, farming and agriculture are the primary livelihood sources 
(Confidential). In bigger cities such as Kabul, it is more common for children to come from 
schooling. A previous academic background in Afghanistan can be another factor determining 
whether or not migrant families will send their children to school, particularly for girls who come 
from rural areas. Rural families may not know the processes required to enroll children in 
schools and hold more conservative beliefs, especially if they come from formerly Taliban-
controlled areas. That being said, the education system in Afghanistan has been slowly 
improving since the fall of the Taliban in the early 2000s. For Afghan repatriates, who mainly 
repatriate to urban areas in Afghanistan, both boys and girls may have a better chance of seeking 
an education.   
 
F) Gender Roles in Education 
Given the traditional values present in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is unsurprising 
that migrant families are more likely to send their male children to school in the host community 
over their female children. Long-standing gender roles keep families from sending their girls to 
school when they feel that they could invest more in their male children. Gendered expectations 
of girls in Afghan and Pakistani society dictate that women remain home to see over domestic 
duties. Girls face more considerable obstacles to access schooling, including child marriage, 
safety, and lack of female teachers. Many Afghan girls cannot travel to school by themselves 
without a male family member and cannot be taught by a male teacher after reaching 
adolescence, obstacles that their male counterparts do not face. Gender-friendly schools that 
offer female bathrooms and viable transport options for girls are also scarce. This creates a 
cyclical problem in which girls are not getting secondary and higher education, and therefore 
cannot become teachers to instruct the next generation of girls. It also inhibits girls from 
becoming female doctors to focus on women's health, especially in rural areas. Even when it 
comes to taking care of their hygiene and prenatal care, women who received schooling when 
they were young can better face these challenges (Jenner 12).  
 
According to a UNICEF study, Afghan girls' survey responses for not attending school 
overwhelmingly showed that 1) they are not allowed and 2) they are expected to help in the 
house. Alternatively, Afghan boys' survey responses showed that their reasons for not attending 
school were mainly that 1) they have to work to provide for their family, 2) their family faces 
financial constraints, and 3) education is not valued in their household over other trades (Nicolle 
14). In addition to paying heed to rural and urban differences when formulating policy solutions, 
considering the gender divide in Afghan and Pakistani culture is imperative. 
 
Policy Recommendations: Educational Services  
Objectives: 
I. Policy changes 
a. Amend the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2012 so that it does not 
require families to provide proof of age by birth certificate.  
b. Include Afghan refugee education as a special section in national education 
reform programs and planning. 
c. Include Afghan adult refugee education as a special subsection in national 
education reform programs and planning to increase the adult literacy rate. 
II. Financial assistance 
a. Afghan refugee education is still funded by emergency funds. This is not 
appropriate since many Afghan families have been in Pakistan for generations. 
b. International organizations need to finance Afghan refugee education in the 
following areas: free tuition at private schools, transportation to school, and 
financial subsidies to families sending a child to school who would otherwise be 
working to encourage long-term human capabilities investment. This is especially 
important in urban areas because children are more likely not to attend school 
because of work.   
c. Use international oversight to monitor how emergency foreign aid is being spent 
by the Pakistani government to ensure it is used for the most pressing concerns 
facing schools such as classroom space, furniture, and toilets. 
III. Rural education accessibility 
a. Expand curriculum and training for home-based learning. 
b. Expand broadband WiFi access across rural areas.  
c. Create bus systems to serve as transportation options for students far from the 
school. 
IV. Closing the gender gap 
a. Train Afghan women to be teachers to create employment opportunities and allow 
more Afghan girls to attend school. 
b. Offer more part-time school options that will be accessible for girls if they are 
expected to stay home to do household work.  
V. Curriculum changes 
a. Review curriculum for sensitivity towards minority issues.  
b. Mandate check-ins for children at different stages of schooling. If a student is 
considering dropping out, equip school officials with information on alternative 
vocational options.  
c. Expand vocational training programs in refugee villages and other refugee-
populated areas.  
VI. Conclusion 
Afghan refugees are one of the most vulnerable populations in the world today. The diaspora 
has migrated across the globe, with one of the largest communities settling in Pakistan. Through 
careful analysis of existing policies and trends for this group, this study has offered several 
policy suggestions for the Pakistani government to improve their healthcare and educational 
opportunities. Moving people deserve to feel secure regardless of their statelessness, and it is the 
responsibility of hosting countries to see the humanity in each new arrival. As the state of 
countries in conflict is everchanging, its migrants' basic needs remain the same. This study hopes 
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